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Two approaches took the lead in the negotiations to dismantle
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement kMFA): (1) a phaseout within the
framework of the MFA, proposed by developing countries, the
EC, Japan, and the Nordic countries, and (2) a new transitional
structure relying on global quotas with country allotments for
currentquota holders,  suggested  by theUnited States  andCanada. COVI
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Under both scenarios, accelerated quota growth  degree of processing), or some criterion pertain-
is the main device for phaseout. Country quotas,  ing to the historical record, such as quota use.
in the first approach, and global quotas in the
second, will have to expand in such a way to  The historical record reveals that growth in
avoid a "shock" when they are abolished at the  highly utilized (that is, filled and binding) quotas
end of the phaseout.  was significantly lower compared with unfilled
quotas. Phaseout scenarios based on quota
To negotiate a quota-growth scenario-  growth may have to take into consideration this
whether this be in the framework of the MFA or  distinction to achieve an effective relaxation.  In
through global quotas - the parties need points  this context, scrapping unfilled quotas in stages,
of departure, such as base-year quota levels or  depending on their use record, would hasten the
quota growth rates.  The guideline in the MFA  dismantling of the MFA by allowing the concen-
was a 6 percent annual quota growth.  Develop-  tration of efforts to deal with binding quotas.
ing countries consider this a concession obtained
from industrial markets and request it as the  An MFA-based phaseout is appealing to
minimum base-year quota growth rate.  many developing countries because, in principle,
the "acquired rights" of the exporters can be
In fact, there were large variations in quota  preserved. Not for long, however.  When
growth across products and suppliers, as well as  substantial quota expansions take place, as the
across markets, and on the whole quotas ex-  quotas on efficient suppliers become redundant,
panded at a significantly lower rate. For the  quota holdings will be worthless.  Interestingly
phaseout, the negotiating parties may therefore  enough, an accelerated quota growth not differ-
consider allowing some differentiation in quota  entiated across suppliers, as suggested by the
growth rates, particularly across product catego-  developing countries, would do exactly that.
ries.
There is one important virtue in a phaseout
The second most important element in the  based on the current structure of the MFA.  Not
phaseout proposals - beside expanding quotas  only are the mechanisms in place familiar to the
and abolishing them at the end of the phaseout  negotiating parties, but so are the magnitudes of
period - is scrapping them along the way  most of the parameters: current quota levels,
according to some predetermined criteria and  quota growth rates over the last few years, and
scheme.  In the proposals, this is defined in terms  their vse ratios.  If this approach is adopted,
of country characteristics (such as new entrants  however, the parties have to make a concerted
and least developed countries), specific products,  effort to keep in mind that this is not an exten-
product characteristics (such as type of fibers or  sion of the MFA, but its abolition.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The  Multi-Fibre  Arrangement  (MFA)  is  a  framework  of  "voluntary  export
restraints"  regulating  textile  and  clothing  exports  of  most  developing  countries
entering  nearly  all  major  industrial  markets.'  The  main instruments  of the  MFA
are bilaterally  negotiated  quotas  in narrowly  defined  product categories.
Although  the  first  MFA  was signed  in 1974,  its  origins  go back to 1937,  when
the US  imposed restrictions  on  Japanese textiles  under  the guise of  a
"gentlemen's  agreement".  Ir-  the  1960s,  similar  but  more  encompassing  arrangements
on cotton textiles  were concluded  which were extended  to include  the major
developing  country  suppliers.
The 1974  MFA was consequently  extended  three  times,  and  currently
covers  products  made  of  wool,  silk,  vegetable  fibers  and  man-made  fibers,  as  well
as cotton  (see,  e.g.,  Goto's  (1989)  survey). More than  half of all textile
fibers,  textiles  and  clothing  imported  from  developing  countries  by industrial
nations  are  subject  to  MFA  quotas  (see  Erzan,  Goto  and  Holmes  (1990)).  The  MFA
**  The  views  expressed  in this  note  are those  of the  authors  and  do not
necessarily  reflect  the  views  of the  World  Bank.  In  particular,  the  arguments
and examples  presented  in the paper  have no prejudice  whatsoever  as to the
position  of any country  or territory  or any grouping  of such,  or any other
institution.
The  authors  gratefully  acknowledge  valuable  comments  by Bela  Balassa,
Don Keesing,  Kala Krishna  and Paul  Meo on an earlier  draft.  The authors  are
solely  responsible  for  the  remaining  errors  and  imperfections.
1  See Raffaelli  (1990)  for  a complete  list of developed  and developing
country  signatories  of the  MFA, and bilateral  restraint  agreements  concluded
accordingly.2
is one  of the most comprehensive  and discriminatory  deformations  of  the
international  trading  s"stem:  it  discriminates  against  developing  countries'  most
important  manufactures  in  a selective  manner,  and  it  prescribes  managed  trade.
While  the  MFA contradicts  both the  letter  and  the  spirit  of the  GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the latter  has until now endorsed this
derogation.
The current  MFA (MFA  IV) is  due to expire  on  July 31,  1991,  seven
months  after the scheduled  conclusion  for the Uruguay  Round of Multilateral
Trade  Negotiations  under  the  auspices  of the  GATT.  One  of the  factors  which
convinced  the developing  countries  to take an active  part in this round of
negotiations,  and  which  enabled  the  inclusion  of  new  areas  such  as services  in
the  negotiating  agenda,  was  an agreement  on finding  ways to  dismantle  the  MFA.
The Punta  del Este  Declaration  of September  1986  which formally  launched  the
Uruguay  Round stipulated  that "[N]egotiations in the area of textiles  and
clothing  shall aim to formulate  modalities  that would permit the eventual
integration  of  this  sector  into  GATT  on  the  basis  of  strengthened  GATT  rules  and
disciplines,  thereby  also  contributing  to  the  objective  of  further  liberalization
of trade.'
In  earlv  1989,  the  negotiations  regarding  modalities  for  integrating
textiles  and  clothing  into  the  GATT started. It  was agreed  in  April  that  the
MFA  restrictions,  and  its  rules  and  provisions  which  are inconsistent  with the
GATT  should  be phased  out  beginning  in  1991,  with the  conclusion  of the  Round.
Following  a  transitionary  period, trade in textiles  and clothing  would be3
integrated  into  the  GATT  proper. 2 The  Contracting  Parties  were asked  to table
their  proposals  to  achieve  this  result,  and  since  then  a  number  of  proposals  have
been  circulated  for  discussion  and  eventually  for  negotiation.  While  we shall
summarize  these  proposals,  a conceptual  typology  is useful  to  discuss  them.
Following  Wolf  (1990),  various  approaches  in  eliminating  the  MFA  can
be  grouped  into  three  broad  categories:  "i)  liberalization  within  the  framework
of the  MFA,  ii)  an immediate  fall-back  onto a revised  GATT;  and iii)  hybrid
schemes,  such  as tariff  quotas  and  auctioned  quotas,  which  modify  the  KFe',  while
still maintaining  features  of it" (p. 225).  The proposals  tabled  by the
developing  countries,  as  well as the  EC,  the  Nordic  countries  and  Japan,  fall
largely  into  the  first  category,  i.e.,  a phaseout  within  the  framework  of the
MFA.  A pure case is Sweden,  which  ai-  junced  that it  would terminate  all its
bilateral  quotas  when  the  current  MFA  expires  in  July  1991. The  US and  Canadian
proposals,  on  the  other  hand,  depict  a  new  transitional  structure  mainly  relying
on global  quotas. Although  the  numerous  proposals  contain  many  other  elements
concerning  the  complex  provisions  of  the  MFA,  there  is  an  increasing  polarization
around the MFA-based phaseout versus the global quota-based  transitional
structures.  The  conciliatory  Swiss  suggestion  that  each  country  can  be allowed
to cdhoose  its own way apparently  has not reduced  this polarization  in the
negotiations.
2  The  GATT-consistent  instruments  are  tariffs  with  bound  rates. Temporary
measures  are  allowed  only in exceptional  and  well-defined  situations,  and are
subject  to strict  procedures.4
A  *'orough  evaluation  of  alternative  approaches  to  returning  textiles
and clothing  to normal  GATT trading  rules is found in articles  by Bagchi,
Raffaelli,  Sampson  and Takacs,  ana Wolf in a recent  World Bank publication
entitled  Textiles  Trade  and the DeveloRing  Countries:  Eliminating  the  MFA in
the  1990s  (Hamilton,  ed., (1990)).  The  analyses  in  the  volume  cover  almost  all
important  conceptual  aspects  of the  current  phaseout  proposals  despite  the  fact
that  they  were tabled  at about  the  time  of thei  book's  publication. 3 The  study
concluded  that "irreversibility,  simplicity,  flexibility  and some degree  of
continuity  is the  formula  for  abolishing  the  MFA".
Besides  giving  a  very brief  account  of recent  phaseout  proposals,
the  purpose  of this  paper  is  to investigate  the  main  instruments  and  suggested
parameters  of the  two  leading  approaches  by  exploring  their  implementation  with
actual  data,  with  all  the  detail  and  practical  problems  that  are  involved.  Under
both  s,cenarios,  whether  the  HFA  till  be  phased  out  within  its  cvrrent  framework
or  there  will  be a  new  transitional  structure  with  global  quotas  -- quotas  would
remain  to  be the  central  instrument.  In the  first  case,  country  quotas,  in  the
other  case,  global  quotas  will  have to  expand  in such  a  way to avoid  a "shock"
when  they  are  abolished  at  the  end  of  the  phaseout.  According  to  the  outstanding
proposal  on  global  quotas,  current  quota  holders  will  have  allotments  during  the
phaseout  period.  Depending  on the choice  of base year quota  levels,  growth
rates,  etc.,  there  will be losers  and gainers  in terms  of these  transitional
quota  allotments.  By  applying  the  proposals  to  actual  data,  this  paper  focuses
3  This is not a complete  coincidence;  the volume is the result  of a
workshop  in  June 1989  which  brought  together  researchers,  textile  experts  and
negotiators.5
on their  modi operandi,  raising  some critical  issues  that  must be addressed
during  the  course  of the  negotiations.
The  paper  is organized  in the  following  manner. Section  II gives
a brief account  of the  phaseout  pruposals  tabled  by developed  and developing
countries. In  Section  III,  the  historical  MFA  quota  growth  in the  EC and the
US is analyzed.  Past quota growth  is a key input for an agreement  on any
phaseout  scenario  based  on transitionary  quotas. Section  IV  depicts  a  phaseout
within  the  framework  of the  MFA  which  relies  on accelerated  quota  growth  based
on the historical  record.  Also considered  is a  stage-wise  scrapping  of
underutilized  quotas  which  would  hasten  the  elimination  of the  restrictions.
Section  V deals  with a phaseouC  based  on global  quotas  along  the  lines  of the
US proposal.  We investigated  the  immediate  consequences  of  this  proposed  shift
by applying  it to the  US market.  Finally,  Section  VI underlines  some  of the
critical  issues  the  negotiators  might  have  to  address  in  their  future
consideration  of the two leading  proposals. We distit.guish  the differences
between  the  way  MFA-based  versus  global  quota-based  phaseouts .- ld  affect  trade
during  the transition  period. As important  in determining  the  nature  of the
regime,  however,  are  the  parameters  that  would  have  to  be agreed  upon.6
II.  PHASEOUT  PROPOSALS  TABLED
The  main  elements  of the  proposals  to  phase  out the  MFA  which  were
submitted  to the  Negotiating  Group  on Textiles  and Clothing  are  summarized  in
this  Section.  Some of the  earlier  statements  are omitted,  and amendments  to
outstanding  proposals  are  merged  with the initial  proposals. We ordered  the
presentation  in the following  manner:  First  we took up industrial  country
proposals,  then  those  tabled  by the  developing  countries;  within  each  group  we
followed  the  chronological  order  of the  submissions.
Industrial  Country  ProRosals
In  July  1989,  the  ZQ proposed  that  from  August  1.  1991,  existing  MFA
restrictions  should  be progressively  and gradually  eliminated  in stages,
contingent  on  strengthened  GATT  safeguard  rules. However,  it  has  been  insistent
that  the  phaseout  should  include  a  transitional  safeguard  mechanism  against  cases
of  market  disruption  which would  allow  emergency  actions  and  bilaterally  agreed
selective  quotas.4  Accordingly,  during  an  injury  investigation,  if  a  preliminary
determination  were  made  that  a  large  increase  in  imports  from  a  specific  country
was  causing  serious  injury  to domestic  producers,  consultations  would  be held
within ten working days to reach  bilateral  agreement  on the level of that
country's  exports  to the  EC.  If agreement  is  not reached,  the imr-.rter  would
be able  to unilaterally  impose  a temporary  quota  on imports  from  that  country.
4  "Selectivity"  or  discrimination  in  safeguards  is  a long  standing  request
of the  EC,  not  only in the  context  of the  MFA.  Wolf (1990)  warns  that 'there
is  a danger  that  the  price  of liberalizing  the  MFA  would  be acceptance  of some
o' its  basic  features  within  the  GATT  itself".7
If injury  were determined  at the conclusion  of the investigation,  the  two
parties  would  enter  into  consultations,  but  the  importer  would  be able  to  apply
safeguard  measures  in  the  meantime.  The  resulting  measures  would be temporary,
and  remain  in  place  for  a  certain  number  (as  yet  undetermined)  of  months. Least
developed  countries  would  be exempt  from  the  transitional  safeguard  measures.
In  June 1990,  the  EC submitted  a communication  further  clarifying
its  position. The  phaseout  would  take  place  in stages  within  the  framework  of
the  MFA.  At each stage,  a certain  percent  (to  be yet decided)  of the  total
volume  of existing  quotas  would  be abolished.  The  participants  could  choose  to
phase  out  quotas by  type of  fiber, type of  product, by  country, by
'liberalization  of certain  types  of trade,"  or a  combination  of these  methods.
Remaining  quotas would be  subject to escalating  growth rates.  Regarding
transitional  safeguards,  the EC proposed that they should  be based on a
multilaterally  agreed  test  for  real  risk  or actual  market  disruption. The EC
has  not  yet taken  a position  on the  duration  of the  phaseout.
Finland:  on  behalf  of Nordic  countries,  in  December  1989,  proposed
using  the  current MFA regime  and  the axisting  quotas  as a point  of departure
for the  phaseout  of the  MFA; beginning  on ;.ugust  1, 1991  and  ending  no later
than December  31, 1999.  Components  of the phaseout  would include  special
safeguards  for  textiles  and  clothing;  a  faster  phaseout  for  the  least  developed
and small  suppliers;  immediate  removal  of aggregate  quotas  and  quotas  on items
with  no  domest'Jc  production;  immediate  elimination  of  quotas  that  were  less  than
50 percent  filled;  and  at an early  stage,  removal  of the  quotas  on handloomed
items, handicrafts,  and children's  clothing.  The proposal envisaged an8
accelerated  quota  growth  for  the  remaining  products  under  restrictions.  Proposed
yearly  growth  rates  for  the  eight  year  period  were,  consequently,  7, 8,  10,  12.
14,  16,  18  and 20  percent.
In February  1990,  Japan  proposed  ending  the  MFA as it expires  in
July  1991,  with  the  stipulation  that  any  existin-  bilateral  quotas  could  remain
until  the  end  of 1991. The  transition  of textile  and  clothing  trade  to GATT's
general  safeguards  provisions  should  take  no longer  than  8  years  (i.e.,  the  end
of  1999)  through  yearly  liberalizations  of  -he  restrictions  and  by  the  imposition
of more stringent  transitional.  measures.  The proposal  suggested  that quota
levels  should  be determined  by adopting  the  actual  import  or quota  level  as the
base  and  multiplying  it  by a  factor  that  increased  each  year. It  also  contained
provisions for  increased flexibility  in enforcing the  quotas. 5 As  for
transitional  measures,  the  proposal  envisaged  the  formation  of a multilateral
surveillance  board,  like  the  current  GATT  Textiles  Surveillance  Body. On  a  case-
by-case  basis,  this  board  would  authorize  transitional  measures,  i.e.,  temporary
quotas. As the  phaseout  proceeds,  the  board  would  make it  more difficult  to
'nvoke  transitional  measures.
The  United  States  tabled  two  alternative  yet related  proposals  in
February  1990,  both  based  on  global  quotas  for  MFA  product  categories;  envisaging
a ten year  phaseout.  Nonetheless,  the US noted that it was prepared  'to
5  The  "flexibility"  provisions  of the  MFA,  i.e.,  "swing",  "carry-over"  and
"carry-forward",  allow use of unutilized  portions  of quotas across  product
categories  and  over  time,  within  certain  limits.9
continue  work in [the  Negotiating  Group  on Textiles  and  Clothing]  on a system
extrapolaced  from  the  M-A,  as suggested  by many  participants".
The  US  proposal  comprised  global  quotas  with  a  comprehc_Isive  volume
limit  for each MFA category.  Thie  total  quantity  for  each item  would then  be
divided  between  allocations  for  current  quota  holders,  and  a common  basket  for
the rest of the world (excluding  Canada  and Israel  which have free trade
agreements  with the  US). The  global  basket  wculd  expand  annually  with  a  growth
factor  which would be differentiated  according  to the "sensitivity"  of the
product  group. It  was  envisaged  that  there  would  only  be  a  couple  of  sensitivity
classes  for  ;;il  products;  quotas  on  some  categories  deemed  non-sensitive  would
be abolished. The  base level  of each  global  quota  would  be determined  by the
actual  average  US imports,  plus  some  margin. Current  MFA quota  holders  would
be entitled  to allocations  within  the  global  quotas. These  would  be based  on
each  country's  share  in total  imports,  but  limited  to  15 percent  of the  global
quota  in  each  category.  While  exporters  would  contir.4e  to  administer  their  own
quota  allocations,  the  global  basket  would  be run  by the  importing  country.
The  original  US  proposal  envisaged  that  the  country  allocations  would
shrink  by 10  percent  (of  the  initial  base  quota)  annually,  with this  reduction
transferred  to the  global  basket.  The scheme  would result  in having  only a
global  basket  at the  end  of the  phaseout,  with no country  allocations. in a
recent  modification  to its  proposal,  in May 1990, the  US declared  that the
minimum  exporter  quota  allocations  would  stay  constant  during  the  duration  of
the phaseout.  Consequently,  the global  basket  would grow more slowly  than10
originally  envisaged. The  recent  communique  explicitly  stated  that  the  "country
minimum  guarantees  would  be fully  tradeable  among  exporting  countries."
The  initial US  proposal of  February 1990 also  contained an
alternative  approach relying on global tariff-quotas. However, this was
described  in a sketchy  manner  and  has  not  been articulated  since. 6 The basic
setup  would  be  the  same  as  described  above,  but  this  approach  "...  would  feature
a two-tier  tariff  system  with  country  allocations  and  a global  basket  for  the
lower  tier  (with  lower  tariffs),  shifting  over time  toward  the  global  basket.
Imports  within the qu&ntitative  limits of the lower tier would enter at
applicable  duty rates.  However,  additional  imports  above and beyond these
quantitative  limits  would  be permitted  at substantially  higher  penalty  tariff
rates".
Canada's  March 1990 proposal  for terminating  the MFA upon its
expiration  foresaw  special  safeguard  measures  for the transition  period  that
should  be patterned  after  GATT's  Article  XIX,  with two  temporary  derogations:
i) substituting  the  concept  of market  disruption  (or  real risk thereof)7  for
Article  XIX's serious injury  concept,  and ii) eliminating  the Article  XIX
requirement  for  compensation  due to an exporter  if a safeguard  measure  is put
in  place.
6  The  US communique  of  May 1990  does  not  take  up the  global  tariff-quota
approach.
7  "Market  disruption  (or  real  risk  thereof)"  is  quite  different  from  the
"serious  injury"  concept. It is  an  MFA  invention  according  to  which  a specific
supplier's  "low  prices",  i.e.,  its  competitiveness,  can be a cause  of market
disruption.  Hence,  it is  a selective,  discriminatory  mechanism.11
The  special  safeguard  measures  would  be applied  to  global  quotas  on
specific  products.  The global  quotas  would  be progressively  liberalized  by
gradually  removing  items  from the global  quota  list and by providing  minimum
growth  rates  for  items  under  quota. "Special  treatment"  would  be given  to  least
developed  countries.
DeveloRing  Country  Proposals
At a  very early  stage,  in  February  1988,  Pakistan  suggested  a four
phase  process  to integrate  textiles  and  clothing  into the  GATT.  In the  first
phase,  restrictions  on non-apparel  products  would  be removed,  and the  criteria
of "low  prices"  for invoking  "market  disruption"  would  be scrapped. In the
second  phase,  restrictions  on apparel  would  be applied  only  in accordance  with
Article  3  of the  MFA,  which  provides  for  measures  taken  when  market  disruption
occurs. In  the  third  phase,  these  restrictions  would  be  activated  only  with  the
approval  of  the Textiles Surveillance  Body, in cases when actual market
disruption  had been established. In the final  phase,  all  restrictions  on
apparel  would  also  be eliminated.
India's  October  1989  proposal  for  a phaseout  envisaged  that  upon
the  expiration  of  MFA  IV,  the  restrictions  on  the  following  would  be eliminated
immediately:  imports  from  least  developed  countries,  new  fibers  added  under  MFA
IV,  handloomed  and  handicraft  products,  group  and  aggregate  quotas,  and  quotas
with less  than  50  per  cent  utilization.  India  proposed  that  the  quotas  on the
other  products  should  be scrapped  in  five  years: 20  percent  of them  each  year;12
and  the  quotas  remaining  in  place  should  grow  by 15,  20,  25,  30  and 35  percent
each  year. Safeguards  during  the  phaseout  would  be GATT  Article  XIX  safeguards
provisions.
Bangladesh,  on  behalf  of  the  least  developed  countries,  in  November
1989,  proposed  that  all  existing  restrictions  facing  least  developed  countries,
should  have  an accelerated  phaseout. Also  no transitional  regimes  should  apply
to them. Furthermore,  they  should  be exempt  from  any  new  safeguard  measures.
In  December  1989,  Indonesia,  acting  also  on  behalf  of  Malaysia,  the
PhilioRines,  Singapore,  and  Thailand,  proposed  that  the  transition  period  begin
in  August  1991,  and  end  by the  year  2000. Their  proposal  called  for  an  immediate
removal  of quotas  on vegetable  fibers,  silk  blends,  handloomed  and  handicraft
products,  and  items  not  produced  in  the  importing  countries.  They  also  requested
the  removal  of some  of the  special,  restrictive  provisions  of the  MFA  (antisurge
provisions,  outward  processing  traffic  limits,  group  and  aggregate  quotas,  and
the  basket  extractor  mechanism).  The  proposal  envisaged  that  the  phaseout  would
take  place  by expanding  the  remaining  quotas  at  progressively  increasing  growth
rates,  starting  with  a  minimum  of  6  percent,  accompanied  by greater  flexibility
provisions.
In December  1989,  the International  Te2:tiles  and Clothing  Bureau
(ITCB),  the  major  grouping  of  textile  and  clothing  exporting  developing  countries13
and territories,  made its  proposal. 8 The ITCB  proposal  envisages  a phaseout
within the existing  structure  of the  MFA.  This would take place through  a
progressive  quota  elimination  based  orn  type  of fiber  and  degree  of processing,
as  well  as a  minimum  growth  rate  of  6  percent  from  the  base  quota  levels. Quota
expansion  would  accelerate  throughout  the  transition,  and  new  entrants  and  cotton
and wool producing  countries  would enjoy  higher  quota  growth  rates in their
native  products.
The  minimum  viable  production9  concept  would  be eliminated,  as  would
other  restrictions  (such  as limits  on outward  processing  traffic  and  aggregate
and  group  quotas). Limits  on flexibility  provisions  would  be removed. While
ITCB  had  no  objections  to  strict  and  well  defined  transitional  safeguard  measures
for categories  remaining  under restrictions,  they proposed  that normal  GATT
safeguards  apply  to  items  not  currently  covered  by  quotas,  and  those  liberalized
during  the  transitionary  period.
The  ITCB proposed least developed countries receive "special
treatment". Also certain  products,  such as children's  clothing,  handlooms,
handmade  and  folkcraft  products,  and  products  with  no domestic  production,
would  be subject  to  preferential  treatment.
8  ITCB consists  of 21 developing  countries  and territor-.es:  Argentina,
Bangladesh,  Brazil, Colombia,  China,  Egypt, El Salvador,  India, Indonesia,
Jamaica,  Rep.  of  Korea,  Macao,  Maldives,  Mexico,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Hong  Kong,  Sri
Lanka,  Turkey,  Uruguay  and  Yugoslavia.
9 Minimum  -fable  production  is  a  Nordic  concept  based  on  national  security
concerns.14
In June  1990, ITCB tabled "a framework for phasing out MFA
restrictions"  which  articulated  its  previous  proposal. It  laid  down  a  six-year,
four-stage  phaseout:  the  first  and  second  stages  extending  2  years  each,  and  the
third  and  fourth  stages  one  year  each. Annual  volumes  of  quotas  expiring  on  July
31,  1991  would  constitute  the  base levels. In the  first  year  of the  phaseout,
they  would  expand  at least  6 percent  "provided  that such  increase  shall  in  no
case be at a  rate lower than that established  in the bilateral  agreement
applicable  immediately  before  the  commencement  of  this  Agreement".  In  the  second
year,  the  increase  would  be 8 percent,  and  in the following  years,  11, 15,  20
and  25  percent. Two  percentage  points  would  be added  to  these  growth  rates  for
the cotton  products  of cotton  producers. By the end of the  sixth  year,  all
quotas  would  be scrapped.
The  proposed  scheme  includes  a  detailed  list  of  products  defined  in
terms of the new "Harmonized  Commodity  Description  and Coding  System" for
progressive  elimination  of  quotas  over  the  four  stages. The  "special  treatment"
which would be accorded  to least  developed  countries  and to some products
envisaged  in ITCB's  initial  proposal  is  also  spelled  out. All  restrictions  on
them  would  be abolished  at  the  very  start  of the  phaseout. Together  with  these,
all  restrictions  on products  made of  vegetable  fibers,  their  blends,  and silk
blends --  items  which were put under restriction  in  MFA IV --  would be scrapped.
Also quotas  on small  producers,  defined  as those  which  account  for less than
one  percent  of  total  textile  and  clothing  imports  in  a  market,  would  be  abolished
upfront.  Finally,  the proposal  articulated  the flexibility  provisions,  the
transitional  safeguard  measures,  and  the  monitoring  'body  which  would  supervise
the  implementation  of the  phaseout.15
Hong Kong's proposal  of December  1989 to phase out all quota
restrictions  on textiles  and  clothing  was  along  the  lines  of the  ITCB  and the
Nordic proposals.  In a phaseout  based on export control within the MFA
framework  rather  than  a new  transitional  system,  Hong  Kong  suggested  a greater
market  access  for  all  exporting  countries,  including  the  major  suppliers.  Hong
Kong  had a  preference  for  India's  five  year  phaseout  period.16
III. HISTORICAL  QUOTA  GROWTH  RATES
To  negotiate  a  quota  growth  factor,  whether  this  be in  the  framework
of  the  MFA  or through  global  quotas,  the  parties  need  points  of  departure. The
guideline  in the  MFA  was  a 6  percent  annual  quota  growth. Developing  countries
considered  this  a  concession  obtained  from  industrial  markets,  and  envisaged  in
their  phaseout  proposals  that  the  minimum  base  year  quota  growth  rate  would  be
6  percent. In  fact,  however,  there  were  large  variations  in  quota  growth  across
products  and suppliers,  as well as across  markets,  and on the whole quotas
expanded  at  a  significantly  lower  rate. In  this  Section  we  study  the  US and  EC's
quota  growth  in the  most  recent  years  for  which  we have  data.  Our  examination
underlines  a  number  of  measurement  problems.  Although  they  are  simplistic,  they
are  relevant  to the  negotiations.
EC
Since  the  EC  publishes  its  MFA  quotas  in  advance,  we  have  the  figures
up to 1991.  Our  computations  based  on these  unadjusted  rates  --  not  adjusted
for revisions  and application  of the flexibility  provisions  --  indicate  that
overall  growth  of quotas  had  a 2.7  per  cent  annual  average  for  the  period  1983
to 1986.  This is in terms  of total  metric  tons for all MFA categories  and
suppliers. The average  was roughly  the  same,  2.8  percent,  for the 1987-1991
period.Table 1:  SUMMARY STATISTICS ON  AVERAGE QUOTA GROWTH AND QUOTA UTILIZATION
RATES IN MFA CATEGORIES  OF THE EC AND THE US
No. of MFA  Standard
Categories  Mean  (Weighted)e  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Deviation
EC
-Quota growth ratea,X  3.7  (2.8)  3.6  1.0  6.8  1.5
(1987-1991)
58
-Average  utilizationb,%  63.0  (75.3)  64.3  0.0  111.6  28.7
(1985-1987)
us
-Quota  growth ratec  5.5  (3.7)  2.5  -22.7  86.3  16.1
(1986-1988)
98d
-Average  utilizationC  61.8  (84.1)  75.7  0.0  99.7  33.9
(1986-1988)
Source:  The World Bank computer files on the MFA.
Notes:
a  Based on initial  published quotas.
b  Based on published quotas; revised upwards so as not to allow utilization  greater than 115 percent.
c  Based on adjusted actual quota levels.
d  Number  of MFA categories  for  which the  averages  could  be computed.  The  total  number  of  MFA categories  was 145.
e  While the statistics  presented in the table relate to individual  MFA categories  disregarding their relative
importance,  the  weighted averages  are obtained  by aggregation  of product  categories  using  metric ton (EC)  and
square yard (US)  equivalents.18
Initial  quotas  are  often  subject  to  adjustments.  In  the  case  of  the
EC,  these  are  published  in the  EC  Journals  as they  occur,  but to  our  knowledge
are  not incorporated  into  any  statistical  series. To take into  account  these
adjustments  to  some  extent,  we  revised  the  quotas  upwards  when  shipments  exceeded
the  volumes  of the initial  quotas. With  this  adjustment,  we arrived  at a 3.9
percent  averr.ge  annual  growth  for  the  1983-1986  period. This is  1.2  percentage
points  greeter  than  the  unadjusted  figure,  nevertheless,  considerably  lower  than
the  6  percent  mark.
In the  more detailed  presentation  of EC  quota  growth  (Tables  1  and
2),  we  used  the  1987-1991  published  quotas. While  this  somewhat  underestimates
actual  quota  growth,  our  choice  is  based  on the  fact  that  this  is a consistent
series  during  which  the  same  quotas  prevailed. The  overall  (weighted)  averag2
annual  growth  rate  was  2.8  percent,  but this  rate  varied  from  1.0  to  6.8  percent
across  the  MFA categories.  Table  2 reveals  that  the  range  for  quota  growth  by
exporter  was  between  0.8  percent  (China)  and  7.3  percent  (Sri  Lanka).
US
Unlike  the  EC, the  US does  not  publish  its  MFA quotas  in advance,
but the  annual  adjustments  in quota  levels  are incorporated  in the  published
statistics. Consequently,  av ilable  quota  growth  rates  for  MFA IV stop  short
of 1991,  and  we analyzed  only  1986  to  1988. ts  many  new  quotas  were introduced
during  this  period,  to  arrive  at  a  consistent  estimate  for  overall  quota  growth,
we based  our computations  on bilateral  quotas  which  were in place  in all the
three  years: 1986, 1987 and 1988.  With this qualification,  the (weighted)19
average  annual  quota  growth  turned  out  to  be  3.7  percent. 10 The  variation  across
product  groups  and  suppliers  was  erratic. Across  products,  the  range  was from
minus 23 to (plus)  86 percent  (Table  1); and  across  suppliers  (Table  2), the
figures  were  even  more  erratic  with  major  quota  reductions  as  well  as  expansions.
To sum  up the  major  measurement  problems,  we should  repeat  that:  i)
which  years  to take  as  benchmark,  ii)  how  to incorporate  quota  adjustments,  and
iii)  how to  deal  with  discontinuities/new  quotas,  made  quite  a difference.
A Common  Denominator?
We  observed  that  there  was  no  quota  growth  rate  which  came  close  to
a common denominator  across markets,  across product groups or suppliers.
Nevertheless,  developing  countries  interpret  the  somewhat  fictitious  6 percent
quota  growth  guideline  inscribed  in the  MFA as a concession  obtained  from  the
industrial  countries.  Certainly  this  is  a  bargaining  chip  in  the  negotiations.
However,  more realistically,  .veloping countries  like  to consider  the  actual
growth  of  their  quotas  in  various  markets  --  similar  to  their  sheer  quota  levels
--  as an acquired  right. This  is certainly  not without  qualification.  Quota
growth rates were closely and inversely  related to quota levels, and the
performance  of  the  exporters  in  filling  them  (see  Erzan,  Goto  and  Holmes  (1990)).
Hence,  large  and efficient  exporters  (with  the  exception  of some politically
motivated  cases),  have  experienced  major  declines  in their  quota  growth.
10 Given  the  new  quotas  imposed  during  this  period,  the  3.7  percent  annual
quota  growth  rate  is an overstatement  of the  developments  in  the  US.20
The  counterpart  of  the  "acquired  rights"  argument  from  the  importing
industrial  countries'  point of view is the "sensitivity"  of the products
involved,  and  the  size  and  potency  of  the  suppliers.  Hence,  the  differentiation
in  quota  growth  rates  across  products  presumably  reflected  adjustment  problems,
while  differentiation  across  suppliers  checked  the  "risk  of injury"  by avoiding
import  surges.
The current  proposals  either  explicitly  or implicitly  endorse  a
differentiation  in  quota  growth  rates  across  products.  The  US  proposal  envisages
that there  would be a couple  of sensitivity  classes,  while the developing
countries,  by mentioning  minimum growth  rates, seem to accept an eventual
variation.  Across suppliers,  however, the only exceptions  are for least
developed  countries  and  the  proposal  requesting  higher  quota  expansion  rates  for
new entrants  and (cotton  products  of)  cotton  producers  and (wool  products  of)
wool  producers.
Other  than  these  exceptions,  neither  the  developed  nor  the  developing
countries  propose  to  discriminate  among  the  suppliers  in  terms  of  quota  expansion
rates. Indirectly,  however,  the  suggestions  concerning  a transitory  selective
safeguards  mechanism  ---  such  as the  one emphasized  by the  EC --  would likely
boil down  to lower  quota  growth  rates  for  the large  and efficient  suppliers.
Nevertheless,  keeping  this  as an ad  hoc  mechanism  rather  than  building  it into
the  phaseout  scenarios  might  make  sense.21
Table  2:  PAST  QUOTA  GROWTH  AND  UTILIZATION  RATES,
AND  PROJECTIONS  UNDER  ACCELERATED  QUOTA  GROWTH  - PHASEOUT  SCENARIOS,  PERCENT
Market:  US
1986-1988  1986-1988  A phaseout  scenario
average  quota  average  with  accelerated  quota
utilization  quota  growth  growth:b  annual  average
Exporter  ratea  rate'  quota  growth  rate
Bangladesh  93.9  15.92  35.6
Brazil  60.6  47.48  31.7
Burma  37.8  6.00  23.1
China  94.6  9.35  24.5
Colombia  25.4  324.00  37.9
Costa Rica  57.9  ..  10.5
Dominican Republic  50.2  ..  15.5
Egypt  93.7  19.17  28.7
El Salvador  79.1  0.00  3.9
Guam  91.1  3.70  15.9
Guatemala  20.7  3.70  15.5
Haiti  84.2  -11.73  4.5
Hong  Kong  93.3  3.04  14.7
India  96.1  13.98  30.2
Indonesia  94.7  -5.89  21.0
Jamaica  55.9  ..  13.1
Korea,  Rep.  of  86.5  4.91  15.5
Macao  72.7  5.19  23.0
Malaysia  60.7  32.47  30.2
Mauritius  80.2  14.11  21.5
Mexico  55.3  10.11  24.3
Nepal  49.8  6.06  26.2
Pakistan  82.3  -0.94  20.7
Panama  32.0  -9.91  3.9
Peru  19.0  9.48  24.1
Philippines  79.4  10.56  32.9
Poland  15.6  ..  15.5
Romania  43.9  0.25  16.2
Singapore  67.0  1.81  18.4
Sri  Lanka  92.4  -18.14  18.5
Taiwan  (China)  82.0  5.18  21.5
Thailand  78.4  6.50  22.6
Trinidad and Tobago  0.7  ..  14.1
Turkey  95.4  2.60  16.6
United Arab Emirates  100.0  ..  15.5
Uruguay  77.9  -4.65
Yugoslavia  87.4  2.15
All  courtries  above  84.1  3.7  2.
.int.)22
(Table  2  concld.)
Market:EC
1985-1987  1987-1991  A phaseout  scenario
average  quota  average  with accelerated  quota
utilization  quota  growth  growth:b  annual  average
Exporter  rate'  rated  quota  growth  rate
Argentina  34.4  4.4  18.3
Brazil  72.6  2.8  12.4
China  102.3  0.8  8.0
Hong  Kong  74.1  1.2  6.9
India  58.5  3.0  13.0
Indonesia  77.8  4.1  16.6
Korea,  Rep.  of  80.6  2.6  12.1
Macao  78.6  1.4  6.0
Malaysia  49.5  4.6  18.5
Pakistan  104.9  3.0  13.5
Peru  102.8  5.7  22.3
Philippines  59.8  5.3  21.5
Romania  52.9  4.3  17.7
Singapore  35.2  3.9  16.0
Sri  Lanka  80.5  7.3  27.9
Taiwan  (China)  79.6  2.6  11.1
Thailand  75.6  3.8  15.5
Yugoslavia  79.5  3.1  14.4
All  countries  above  75.3  2.8  12.6
Source: The  World  Bank  computer  files  on the  MFA.
Notes:
a  Based  on  adjusted  actual  levels  of  quotas  which  were in  place  in all  the  three
years:  1986,  1987  and  1988.
b  A five  stage  scenario  where  at each  stage  the  preceding  quota  growth  rate  is
increased  by 50  percent. The  base  rate  is the  average  historical  quota  growth
record. In the  US,  when  historical  quota  growth  rates  could  not  be calculated
for  new  quotas,  the  overall  average  quota  growth  of 3.7  percent  was  plugged  in.
When  growth  rates  were  negative,  a minimum  average  positive  growth  rate  of one
percent  was  adopted  to  serve  as  the  base  rate.
c  Based  on  published  quotas;  revised  upwards  so  as  not  to  allow  utilization  greater
than  115  percent.
d  Based  on initial  published  quotas.23
IV.  A  PHASEOUT  WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK  OF THE MFA
We observed  that  modalities  of a phaseout  within  the  framework  of
the  MFA had four  elements:  (i)  measures  to increase  the "flexibility"  of the
application  of the  MFA --  flexibility  in  both  the  specific  and  general  usage  of
the  term,  ii)  upfront  removal  of the  restrictions  on some  specifically  defined
products  and  suppliers  (mostly  dealing  with the  smaller  and  poorer  exporters),
iii)  acceleration  of the  quota  growth  rates,  and  iv)  elimination  of quotas  in
stages  according  to  a set  of  predetermined  criteria. The  latter  was  defined  in
terms  of country  (such  as new entrants,  least  developed  countries),  specific
products  or product characteristics  (such as type of fibers  or degree of
processing),  or  based  on  some  criteria  pertaining  to  the  historical  record,  such
as quota  utilization.
Since  implementation  of the  quota  elimination  proposals  would  still
leave  the  bulk  of the  quotas  intact,  the  main  element  in  such  a  transition  would
come  from  accelerated  quota  growth. The  quotas  would  have to expand  in  such  a
way to avoid  a "shock"  when they  are  abolished  at the  end  of the  phaseout. A
"phaseout"  without  radical  quota  growth  would  therefore  be a mere  extension  of
the  MFA.
It is  evident  from  our  presentation  in the  previous  Section  that  a
single  base rate to  which  some growth  factor  will  be applied  for all  product
groups,  all  markets  and  suppliers  is  very unlikely. There  will  have to  be at
least  some  differentiation  by product  characteristics.24
An Accelerated Quota Growth
For  demonstration  purposes  we took  the  extreme  case  of  adherence  to
the  current  regime  by adopting  the  actual  historical  growth  rates  of individual
quotas  as  the  basis  for  furtner  expansion.  Hence,  we  al'lowed  for  differentiation
in quota  growth  rates  across  products,  suppliers  and  markets. Using  the  1987-
1991  average  quota  growth  rates  for  the  EC,  and  the  1986-1988  rates  for  the  US,
we applied  a growth  formula in five stages  starting  in 1992 which can be
intevpreted  to cover  a 5-  or  a 10-year  period  (with  two  years  for  each  stage  in
the  'Latter).  We first  rounded  up the  historical  quota  growth  rates  (per  product
and  supplier)  to  the  nearest  percentage  point. Then,  at  each  stage  we increased
the  quota  growth  rate  by 50  percent  of the  previous  stage's  growth  rate. As the
overall  historical  quota  growth  record  is  about  3 to 4 percent,  this formula,
if applied  to the  aggregate  of existing  quotas,  would  nearly  double  the level
in  5  years  (an  effect  which  appeared  not  totally  unacceptable  to  the  negotiating
parties).  In  the  case  of  the  US,  where  quotas  had  an  erratic  pattern,  we adopted
a  number of assumptions  to arrive  at the base year quota level and quota
growth."'
As an example,  Table 3 depicts  Indonesia  in the EC market.  The
largest  textile  product  Indonesia  has  under  MFA  quotas  in the  EC is fabrics  of
man-made  fibers. Indonesia's  1991  quota  for  this  category  is  about  ten  thousand
11 For  quotas  which  were introduced  in  1987,  we took  the  1987-1988  growth
rates;  for  those  introduced  in  1988,  we imposed  the  overall  US  average  for  1986-
1988;  in the  case of  negative  growth,  we plugged  ir.  1.0  percent;  and finally,
we imposed  a 10 percent  ceiling  for  quota  growth  rate.  With these  rates,  we
first  hypothetically  moved  on to 1991,  the  base  year  for  quota  volumes.25
metric ton equivalent.  While quota utilization  in this item exceeded  100
percent,  quota  growth  was limited  to 3  percent. In  our  exercise,  we take  this
as a base rate,  and increase  it by 50 percent. Hence,  in stage  I the  quota
expands  by 4.5  percent  over  the  initial  quota,  and  in stage  II  by 6.8  percent
over  the  quota  level  of  stage  I,  and  so  on.  In  this  example,  by the  end  of  stage
V, the average  annual  growth  rate goes  up from  the initial  3 percent  to 11.7
percent. Accordingly,  at the  fifth  stage,  if  each  stage  lasted  one  year,  the
volume  of  the  quota  would  be 74  percent  greater  than  the  base  year  (1991)  quota.
In  case  each  stage  covered  a two  year  period,  and  the  scheme  stretched  over 10
years,  the  annual  average  quota  gtowth  rate  would  be the  same (11.7  percent).
However,  the  quota  for  the  tenth  year  would  be around  200  percent  greater  than
the  base  year  quota. 
12
We applied  the  above  formula  to  all  bilateral  MFA quotas  in the  EC
and  the  US.  The  results  are  summarized  by exporter  in the  last  column  of Table
2.  In the  case  of the  EC,  it yielded  an overall  average  annual  growth  rate  of
12.6  percent  over the span  of the  five  stages. This average  for  Hong  Kong's
quotas  was  7  percent,  for  China  8  percent  and  on  the  higher  end,  28  percent  for
Sri Lanka.  Across  products,  annual  average  growth  rates  were from 8 to 27
percent.  In the case of the  US, the overall  average  turned  out to be 22.2
percent,  while  acro-s  its  suppliers  this  rate  varied  from  4  percent  (El  Salvador
and Panama)  to 36  percent  (Bangladesh).
12 If  the  average  annual  growth  rate,  11.7  percent,  is  applied  cumulatively
over  10  years,  the  resulting  increase  would  be approximately  200  percent.TabLe 3:  AN ILLUSTRATIVE  EXAMPLE  FOR
AN ACCELERATED  QUOTA  GROWTH-PHASEOUT  SCENARIO  a
Market:  EC  Exporter:  Indonesia
End of  Arnuat
1985-1987  stage  when  1987-1991  Five  stage  acceterpted  Quota votume.  thousand  metric  tons  average
NFA category  avg.  quota  quota  witl  avg.  quota  ouots  growth  .X  1991  Stage  Stage  Stage  Stage  Stage  quota
utiLization  be scrapped  growth  I  II  III  IV  V  base  I  11  III  IV  V  growth
3:fabrics  of  man-  115.0  V  3.0  4.5  6.8  10.1  15.2  22.8  10.03  10.48  11.18  12.32  14.19  (17.42]  11.7
made  fibers
6:outer  garments,  81.4  IV  6.0  9.0  i3.5  20.3  30.4  45.6  3.51  3.83  4.35  5.23  (6.821  9.92  23.1
woven
7:outer  garments,  54.4  1  6.0  9.0  13.5  20.3  30.4  45.6  0.93  (1.021  1.15  1.39  1,81  2.63  23.1
knitted  or  crocheted  P
8:undergarments  82.8  IV  6.0  9.0  13.5  20.3  30.4  45.6  1.81  1.97  2.23  2.69  t3.501  51  10  23.1
men's  and boys'
All  above  77.8  4.1  - - - - - 16.28  17.29  18.92  21.62  26.32  35.07  16.6
Source:  The World  Bank craputer  files  on  the  MFA
Notes:
a  See notes  to  Table  2.
b  At  each  stage,  the  preceding  quota  growth  rate  is  increased  by  50 percent.  The base  rate  is  the  1987-1991  quota  growth.
c  In  the  case  of  quota  scrapping,  the  brackets  indicate  the  last  quota  anmont.27
The summary  tables  we provide  are  admittedly  of very limited  use.
On the  other  hand,  the  detailed  spreadsheets  which  depict for  each  supplier  the
expansion  in  its  individual  bilateral  quotas  under  alternative  assumptions  were
considered  useful  inputs  by the  negotiators.  The  main  lesson  we draw  from  this
exercise  is that,  for  all  practical  purposes,  it  may  be necessary  to agree  on
a  stylized  profile  of  base  year  quota  growth. By  examining  growth  in  individual
quotas,  product  categories  and  suppliers  which fall  into  ranges  such  as up to
2 percent,  between  2 and  4, 4 and 6, and  6 and 8, and above  8 percent  can  be
tabulated. If items  can  be assigned  to such  categories,  the  phasing  out  could
start  with rounding  up the individual  quota  growth  rates  in these  categories,
which  would  then  serve  as the  base  rate  for  further  quota  expansion.
The  prominent  developing  country  proposal  subscribes  to  a (minimum)
6  percent  fixed  base  ye_r growth  rate.  As there  is no differentiation  across
suppliers  and  products,  the  calculation  of  the  resulting  average  growth  in  quotas
is  straightforward  and  requires  no actual  data. Applying  the  expansion  formula
we used above (with  a multiplicative  factor  of 50 percent)  gives an annual
average  growth  rate  of 23.1  percent. Nominally,  this is  almost  equivalent  to
the aggregate  result  we got for the  US, 22.2 percent  (and  nearly  double  the
projection  for the EC, 12.6 percent).' 3 But effectively,  it implies  a far
greater  expansion  in import  volumes. In the  scenario  we simulated,  which  was
13  Actually,  our  scenario  for  the  US which  adopts  historical  quota  growth
rates --  with an overall average of 3.7 percent --  would yield a lower quota
expansion  compared  to  the  scenario  with  a  6  percent  base  year  growth. What  make
the  two  scenarios  come  up  with  similar  aggregate  growth  rates  are  the  assumptions
we adopt  in dealing  with individual  quotas. For  any  quota  that  had  a negative
growth,  we  plug in  one  percent  as  base  year  increase. Furthermore,  we round  up
historical  quota  growth  rates  to the  nearest  percentage  point.28
based  on  historical  quota  growth  rates,  the  high  quota  growth  record  of smaller
suppliers  and  less  "sensitive"  products  were  further  inflated  in  an  accelerated
fashion.  In the aggregate,  this compensated  for the major suppliers'  and
"sensitive"  products'  lower  quota  growth  record. While  developments  in actual
shipments  of the  former  group  would  in  most  cases  fall  short  of the  quota  limit
expansions,  in  the  latter  group,  quotas  would  be largely  filled. Therefore,  the
resulting  shipments  would  be considerably  less  than  what  would  take  place  if  a
fixed  base  year  quota  growth  were  applied  across  the  board.
Finally,  some  practical  points.  In the example  above,  the quota
growth  rate  expanded  with  a constant  multiplicative  factor  (50  percent  or 1.5)
which yielded an accelerated  quota growth.  The recent communique  of the
developing  countries  (ITCB)  submitted  in  June  proposes  growth  rates  of  6,  8,  11,
15,  20 and  25 percent  for  the  six-year  phaseout. These  rates  imply  an almost
constant  multiplicative  growth  factor  of about 33 percent (or 1.33)."  The
proposal  would  yield  an  annual  average  quota  growth  of  14  percent,  and  increase
the  quota  level  by 120  percent  by the  end  of 6 years.
A more radical  quota  expansion  would  result  from  formulae  with an
accelerated  expansion  of the  quota  growth  factor  itself  (such  as a 50 percent
increase  in  the  quota  growth  rate  in  stage  I followed  by a 60  percent  increase
in  the  next  stage). Although  this  is  a  simplistic  point,  it  should  be  underlined
that  an additive  (as  suggested  by some  countries),  rather  than  a  multiplicative
constant  growth  factor  would  yield  a  declining  rate  of  quota  growth  over  the  span
14  The  implicit  growth  rate  multipliers  are  1.33,  1.38,  1.36,  1.33  and  1.25
from  the  second  to  the  sixth  year.29
of the  stages. Also,  growth  induced  by such  formulae  would  be at  a slower  pace
in categories  with a  relatively  higher growth record.  Certainly,  it is
worthwhile  to consider  a  number  of alternative  formulae.  The acceleration
principle  is  the  critical  test.
State-wise  ScraDini of Ouotas
An alternative  to abolishing  all  quotas  at the  end  of the  phasing-
out period is scrapping  some of the quotas  along the  way according  to some
predetermined  scheme.  This  could  follow  specific  product  lists  or  could  be  based
on product  characteristics  such  as type  of fibers  or degree  of p:ocessing  as
proposed  by some  countries. Here  we shall  demonstrate  that  quota  utilization
rates  is also  an extremely  relevant  criterion  in this  respect,  which  also  has
a precedence. In MFA IV, developed  countries  agreed  to scrap  underutilized
quotas,  and  there  were  some  positive  developments  in  this  respect,  particularly
in the EC.  Therefore,  this need not be considered  a new element in the
negotiations  to  phase  out  the  MFA.15
QOoca  Utilization  Rates  and  Ouota  Growth
In  certain  cases,  well  before  quotas  are  filled,  they  have  a  chilling
effect  on exports,  mainly due to inefficiencies  in quota administration.  16
Nevertheless,  utilization  rates  are  a good  proxy  for  the  actual  restrictiveness
15  Alternatively,  scrapping  underutilized  quotas  may  be generalized  under
the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  on  non-tariff  barriers.
16  See  Kumar  and  Khanna  (1990)  concerning  India.30
of quotas.  Consequently,  expansions  in underutilized  quotas  would  often  not
imply any relaxation  in the regime.  That is to say, it is not a major
concession.
The overall  quota  utilization  rate  in the  EC during  the 1985-1987
period  was  75  percent,  and  in  the  case  of  the  US (for  1986-1988),  91  percent  (see
Table  2).  When  we discussed  past  and  prospective  quota  growth  in the  previous
Sections,  we did  not distinguish  between  highly  utilized  (binding)  quotas  and
underutilized  ones. When  this  distinction  is  made,  we  observe  a  major  difference
in  their  past  growth  rate. We  defined  binding  quotas  arbitrarily  as those  with
utilization  rates  90 percent  or above.  In the  EC,  while  the overall  average
annual  growth  in  published  quotas  (1987  to  1991)  was  2.8  percent,  for  those  that
were binding  (in  1987),  this rate  was half that,  1.4  percent. The situation
was similar  in the  US during  the  1986-1988  period. While  the  overall  average
quota  growth  was  3.7  percent  annually,  those  which  were  binding  increased  by  only
2  percent  annually. These  differences  are quite  instructive. The importing
countries  are much more careful  in expanding  those  quotas  which are actual
effective  restraints.
Stage-Wise  ScraRDing  of  Underutilized  Ouotas
What  is  the  value  of,  for  instance,  a  10  percent  annual  quota  growth
when the  quotas  in that  item  were  only  half  filled  over  the  past three  years?
It is clear  that  the  overall  average  quota  growth  we projected  in our  exercise
for the five stage  span of the phase  out, 12.6  percent  for the EC and 22.2
percent  for  the  US, is  partly  filled  with air.31
What if some  quotas  were then  scrapped  at each  stage  depending  on
their  utilization  record? To avoid  perverse  incentives,  this  has to follow  a
predetermined  scheme  based on past performance  during  an agreed  period.  To
demonstrate  the  point,  we used the  same  data  set  as in the  previous  exercise.
For the EC,  we adopted  as a 'benchmark'  the average  utilization  rates  in the
1985-1987  period,  and  for  the  US,  the  1986-1988  period.
Our illustrative  scheme  for  scrapping  the  unutilized  quotas  is the
following. In the  beginning  of 1992,  the first  year of phaseout  stage  I, we
scrapped  all individual  bilateral  quotas  which  had a utilization  less  than 50
percent  in the  benchmark  year.  Similarly,  at the  beginning  of stage II,  we
dropped  all quotas  with  utilization  of less  than  60 percent  (in  the  benchmark
year). Repeating  this  procedure,  in  the  final  stage,  stage  V, only  those  quotas
which  had  a utilization  rate  above  90  percent  are  left. These  are  scrapped  at
the  end  of stage  V.
The  quota-scrapping  scenario  can  be  followed  in  Table  3  which  depicts
Indonesia  in  the  EC  market. Among  the  four  MFA  categories,  the  quota  on the  one
with the lowest quota utilization,  54 percent,  knitted  or crocheted  outer
garments,  would  drop by the  end of stage  I.  Quotas  for two categories  with
utilization  rates  around  80 percent  (women  outer  garments  and  men's  and  boys'
undergarments)  would  drop  by the  end  of  stage  IV. Finally,  the  quota  on  fabrics
of man-made  fibers,  which  was fully  utilized,  would  last  until  the  end of the
phaseout.
Table  4 summarizes  the  results  of applying  this  scrapping  schedule
to  all  exporters  subject  to  quotas  in  the  US and  the  EC. The  first  column  gives
the number  of bilateral  quotas  at the  base year.  To follow  up our  previous32
example,  Indonesia  in the EC, this number  is four.  In the five consecutive
stages,  the  number  of  remaining  quotas  are,  respectively,  4, 3,  3,  3  and  1. For
the  efficient  suppliers  which  have  been  filling  most  of  their  quotas,  there  would
be  relatively less  quota scrapping, especially in  the  earlier stages.
Nevertheless,  for all exporters,  the  number  of quotas  imposed  on them would
diminish  considerably. The overall  effect  of this scheme  would  be a drastic
reduction  in the  number  of  bilateral  quotas,  by 66  percent  (from  259  to 89)  in
the  EC,  and  by 77  percent  (from  1,312  to 297)  in  the  US,  from  the  base  year to
the  last  stage  of the  phaseout.
We should  emphasize  again  that the  main issue  with underutilized
quotas  is not that  there  should  necessarily  be a rigid  schedule  in scrapping
them.  The point is that  a quota  growth  scenario  which  does not address  the
issue  of underutilized  quotas  leads  to inaccurate  representations  as to the
effective  relaxation  of the  regime.
Stage-Wise  Ouota  Scrapping  Based  on Other  Criteria
We did  not  try  scenarios  using  other  criteria  for  stage-wise  quota
scrapping. However,  to the  extent  that  product  categories  or suppliers  can  be
classified  by some  common  characteristics  --  and  the  stage  at which  the  quotas
would  be dropped  are  determined.--  it  is  a  matter  of inserting  this  information
and  rerunning  the  exercise.  There  might  be  some  practical  difficulties  involved,
however,  because  while  MFA categories  distinguish  prolucts  by their  level  of
processing,  in  certain  markets,  notably  in  the  EC,  product  groups  can  cover  goods
made from  different  fibers.33
Table 4:  A FIVE-STAGE QUOTA SCRAPPING
SCHEDULE BASED ON PAST UTILIZATION RATES OF INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS'
Market: US
Number of Bilaterald Quotas
Base
Exporter  Yeare  Stage I  Stage II  Stage III  t_g  ft.IV  tS  V
Bangladesh  14  14  12  11  8  8
Brazil  24  14  12  11  8  8
Burma  1  0  0  0  0  0
China  85  78  72  64  58  49
Colombia  1  0  0  0  0  0
Costa Rica  2  1  1  0  0  0
Dominican Rep. of  6  4  2  1  1  0
Egypt  14  5  4  3  3  2
El Salvador  1  1  1  1  0  0
Guam  1  1  1  1  1  1
Guatemala  1  0  0  0  0  0
Haiti  13  5  5  5  4  1
Hong Kong  62  56  54  47  42  36
India  17  15  14  14  13  8
Indonesia  34  34  31  28  20  17
Jamaica  21  10  9  7  2  1
Korea,  Rep.  of  76  67  63  53  46  32
Macao  116  31  27  23  19  11
Malaysia  35  22  21  17  10  6
Mauritius  13  7  5  5  3  2
Mexico  94  34  28  21  10  6
Nepal  4  1  1  1  1  0
Pakistan  79  36  34  29  20  14
Panama  1  0  0  0  0  0
Peru  9  2  1  0  0  0
Philippines  34  26  26  22  15  7
Poland  114  12  1  1  1  1
Romania  130  20  17  3  1  1
Singapore  112  28  26  23  19  14
Sri Lanka  32  30  28  25  22  17
Taiwan (China)  78  72  65  56  41  22
Thailand  39  31  27  25  22  19
Trinidad & Tobago  8  0  0  0  0  0
Turkey  16  13  12  12  10  8
United Arab Em.  4  4  4  4  4  4
Uruguay  6  2  2  2  1  0
Yugoslavia  15  13  9  7  5  2
All countries above  1312  689  615  522  410  297
(Cont.)34
'Table  4 concld.)
Market:  EC
Numbe..  r_of  oral Ouotasb
base
Exporter  IQUdAX  Stage II  eI  StagII  Sta-e  IV  Stage  V
krgentina  3  1  1  1  1  1
orazil  9  6  4  3  2  2
China  19  19  18  17  15  14
Hong  Kong  28  22  20  14  11  9
India  11  7  4  2  2  2
Indonesia  4  4  3  3  3  1
Korea  Rep.  of  40  27  23  21  18  14
Macao  20  15  12  10  7  6
Malaysia  6  4  2  0  0  0
Pakistan  6  6  6  6  6  3
Peru  2  2  2  2  2  1
Philippines  11  6  5  3  1  1
Romania  28  18  16  16  11  9
Singapore  7  1  0  0  0  0
Sri  Lanka  4  4  4  3  1  1
Taiwan  (China)  36  28  23  19  16  14
,ailand  14  12  10  10  9  8
Yugoslavia  11  9  8  6  5  3
All  countries  above  259  191  161  136  110  89
Source: The  World  Bank  computer  files  on the  MFA.
Notes:
At stage  1,  all  quotas  with  historical  average  utilization  rates  below  50  percent  are
scrapped. In stage  II,  the  seme  is  applied  to  quotas  with  utilization  rates  below  60
percent;  and so on.  In stage  V, only  those  quotas  with utilization  ratios  above  90
percent  remain. By the  end  of this  stage,  all  quotas  are  abolished. For  the  US,  the
utilization  rates  used  are  the  averages  for  1986-1988;  for  the  EC,  1985-1987.
Number  of  bilateral  quotas  exclude  aggregate  group  quotas.
For  the  US, the  base  year  is 1988  actual  quotas.
For  the  EC,  the  base  year  is 1991  published  quotas.35
V.  A PHASEOUT  BASED  ON GLOBAL  QUOTAS
The leading  alternative  to  phasing  out the  MFA  within  its  current
structure  is  a  new  transitional  mechanism  based  on  global  quotas  proposed  by the
US.  We applied  this  proposed  mechanism  using  the  US data  to get  some  idea  of
its  immediate  consequences.
Briefly,  the  proposal  envisages  a ten  year  phaseout,  starting  with
a  shift  to  global  quotas  which  would  expand  gradually.  The  current  quota  holders
under  the  MFA  would  be entitled  to  allocations  within  the  global  quotas. These
allocations  would  be based  on actual  import  market  shares,  but limited  to 15
percent  of the  global  quota  in  each  product  category.
We constructed  global  quotas  for each MFA category  based on the
average  volume  of  US imports  during  the  period  1987  to  1989,  as suggested  in  the
US  communique  of  May  1990.  Using  square  yard  equivalents  (SYE),  we  then  computed
the  aggregate  quota  for  each exporter. We compared  these  volumes  with their
actual  quota  holdings  in  1988 (rather  than  1989  due  to the  lag  in  data  input).
The  first  column  in  Table  5  gives  the  percentage  change  in  exporters'  quotas  due
to this  shift  in  the  base. Then  we limited  the  exporters'  shares  to 15  percent
of total imports  in each product.  The third column  in Table 5 gives the
resulting  percentage  reduction  in aggregate  quota volumes.  Current quota
holders,  taken  together,  would  lose  about  31  percent  of their  quotas  due  to  the36
Table 5:  CHANGE  IN  AGGREGATE  QUOTA  VOLUMES  FOR  CURRENT
QUOTA HOLDERS UNDER THE US  PROPOSAL OF GLOBAL QUOTAS
The  US  market,  change  from  1988.  percent
orter  Change  due  to  new  Change  due  to capping
anked  by  quota  allocation  based  quotas  at 15%  of  Total
elative  loss  on actual  shipments'  import  shareb  Change
uam  -100.0  0.0  -100.0
'rinidad  & Tobago  -99.5  -0.0  -99.5
)oland  -89.5  0.0  -89.5
.owiania  -78.5  0.0  -78.5
eru  -73.0  -0.0  -73.0
anama  -71.9  0.0  -71.9
aailand  -66.0  -7.5  -68.6
apan  -54.3  -30.5  -68.2
,urma  -66.5  0.0  -66.5
aiti  -65.2  0.0  -65.2
Pt  -64.5  0.0  -64.5
aysia  -63.5  -1.0  -63.9
amaica  -57.2  -5.0  -59.3
'olombia  -59.0  0.0  -59.0
.exico  -58.0  -0.8  -58.3
.acao  -58.0  -0.0  -58.0
;ingapore  -52.4  -0.6  -52.7
ugoslavia  -50.7  -0.0  -50.7
epal  -45.5  0.0  -45.5
.orea,  Rep.  of  -20.4  -31.2  -45.2
'aiwan  (China)  -22.4  -26.9  -43.2
ong  Kong  -27.8  -21.3  -43.2
Philippines  -35.3  -12.1  -43.1
zechoslovakia  -41.5  -0.0  -41.5
,razil  -36.7  -5.1  -39.9
ungary  -38.0  0.0  -38.0
Salvador  -37.7  0.0  -37.7
'akistan  -32.0  -6.5  -36.4
China  1.3  -33.3  -32.4
.auritius  -24.7  0.0  -24.7
ermany,  E.  -23.7  0.0  -23.7
,angladesh  -18.9  0.0  -18.9
ruguay  -8.0  0.0  -8.0
osta  Rica  -5.3  -0.0  -5.3
India  16.5  -17.2  -3.5
'ominican  Republic  11.0  -0.3  10.7
donesia  42.6  -5.9  34.2
ited  Arab  Emirates  34.7  0.0  34.7
i  Lanka  42.6  -0.0  42.6
rkey  68.6  -0.2  68.2
atemala  99.9  0.0  99.9
1 Countries  Above  -30.9  -19.5  -44.3
(Cont.)37
(Table  5 concld.)
Source: The  World  Bank  computer  files  on the  MFA
Notes:
a  The  new  quotas  are  set  equal  to  the  average  of actual  shipments
during  1987  to 1989. The  aggregations  are  based  on square  yard  equivalents.
b  The  new  country  quotas  are  limited  to a  maximum  of 15  percent  of tif
import  share  for  each  MFA group.38
new  allocation  based  on actual  shipments,  and  their  quotas  would  suffer  another
decline  of  20  percent,  transferred  to  the  unallocated  basket,  as  a  result  of  the
maximum  import  market  share  constraint.  Their  overall  quota  loss  in the  first
year  would  add  up to  44  percent  of their  initial  quota  holdings.
On a country  by country  basis,  from  Table  S it  appears  that  almost
all current  quota  holders  would lose quota  allocations  due to the proposed
transitional  system. Most  of  the  quota  losses  would  be due  to the  shift  in  the
base for quota  allotments  to the actual  (1987-1989  average)  shipments.  The
difference  between  old quota  volumes  and average  shipment  levels  stems from
quotas  that  were  not  filled  by the  exporters. 17 Countries  that  were  "efficient"
in filling  their  quotas  would  have  smaller  percentage  quota  losses  as a result
of this  shift. Some  countries  would  experience  large  quota  losses  due to the
15 percent  capping  provision. These  are the  major suppliers  which  hold very
large  shares  of the  US imports  of  certain  items  --  China,  K3rea,  Japan,  Taiwan,
and  Hong  Kong.
The  case  of  the  six  countries  which  appeared  to  make  quota  gains  from
the proposed  transition  --  the Dominican  Republic,  Indonesia,  United  Arab
Emirates, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Guatemala --  relates to a  statistical
shortcoming  in our computations. New quotas  imposed  in 1989 affected  large
quantities  of these  countries'  exports. This  in  turn  inflated  their  1987-1989
average  shipments  subject  to  restrictions.  If  we could  use the  1989  quotas  as
17  Obviously,  eliminating  unfilled  quotas  is a potential,  rather  than  an
actu..l  loss  to the  exporters.39
the  basis  of our  comparison  for  initial  quota  holdings  rather  than  1988,  these
countries  would  also  show  quota  losses.
While the proposed  transition  to global  quotas  would reduce  the
reserved  allocations,  it  should  be  remembered  that  loss  in  guaranteed  quotas  need
not  imply  any  loss  in  export  volume  or  market  share  for  an individual  supplier.
The  efficient  suppliers,  after  filling  their  own  quotas,  would  also  dip  into  the
unallocated  basket. For  all  exporters  taken  together,  however,  the  transition
to  global  quotas  in this  case  is  a  major  increase  in  the  restrictiveness  of the
system.
To demonstrate  this  point,  we  have  undertaken  a  numerical  exercise.
During  1988,  the  total  amount  of textile  and clothing  quotas  in the  US market
was 11.2  billion  SYE. As some  suppliers  did  not  fill  their  quotas,  the  overall
imports  against  these  allotments  were  7.3  billion  SYE. Nevertheless,  the  US  was
committed  to absorb  the full  amount,  11.2  billion  SYE, from these  countries.
On top  of that,  the  US imported  3.6  billion  SYE  of  textiles  and  clothing  in  the
same  categories  from  non-restricted  exporters,  mainly  industrial  countries. If
we add the two, i.e., total  quota  holdings  in 1988 plus imports  from non-
restricted  countries,  we arrive  at 14.8  billion  SYE  which is the  ceiling  for
"allowable"  imports.  As the  volume  of  the  global  quotas  would  be  based  on  actual
shipments  alone,  exclusion  of the  unfilled  portion  of quotas,  3.9  billion  SYE
(11.2  less  7.3),  represents  the  loss  in  allowable  imports.
Table  6  ranks  the  exporters  according  to  their  relative  quota  share
losses  computed  in line  with  the  exercise  described  above. In  parentheses  are40
the shares  of the  suppliers  in actual  quota  holdings.  In the second  column,
the  shares  are  adjusted  by adding  imports  from  the  non-restricted  countries  to
the  denominator. These  are then  compared  with the  reserved  shares  in the  new
global  quota,  before  and  after  applying  the  15  percent  capping  provision. The
results  and  the  ranking  of  exporters  in  terms  of their  relative  losses  closely
resemble  those  in  Table  5.
Finally,  we should  note  that,  for  demonstrative  purposes,  we  adopted
a conservative  interpretation  of the US proposal.  In fact, the May 1990
modification  to  the  initial  proposal  stated  that  "[T]he  quotas  for  each  product
would  be set  at  the  average  level  of  the  last  three  years  of  total  imports  (1987-
1989)  plus an additional  increment  which  would  be applicable  to all  countries
utilizing  the  modality  and  which  would  be multilaterally  negotiated".  If  these
"additional  increments"  would  turn  out  to  be  substantial  rather  than  incremental,
the  overall  restrictiveness  of the  proposed  approach  could  vanish.Table  6:  CHANGE  IN  RELATIVE QUOTA  SHARES FOR CURRENT  QUOTA  HOLDERS
UNDER THE US  PROPOSAL OF  GLOBAL  QUOTAS
The  US  market,  base  year  1988,  percent
Share  in  Share  in  Charte  due  Change  due
Exporter  1988  1988  actual  new  quota  to  shift  to  to  capping  Total
ranked  by  Actual  Adjusted  average  allocation  new  base  at  15X  change
relative  quota  quota  quota  shipments:  after  (II-I)/I  (III-ID)/II  (III-I)/I
share  loss  share  sharea  the  new  baseb  capping  at  15X
0  I  II  III  IV  V  VI
Guam  (0.05)  0.04  0.00  0.00  -100.0  0.0  -100.0
Trinidad  & Tobago  (0.31)  0.24  0.00  0.00  -99.3  -0.0  -99.5
Poland  (1.29)  0.98  0.13  0.13  -86.5  0.0  -89.5
Romania  (1.53)  1.16  0.32  0.32  -72.4  0.0  -78.5
Peru  (1.06)  0.81  0.28  0.28  -65.2  -0.0  -73.0
Panama  (0.05)  0.04  0.01  0.01  -63.8  0.0  -71.9
Thailand  (2.86)  2.17  0.95  0.88  -56.3  -7.5  -o8.6
Japan  (5.63)  4.27  2.51  1.75  -41.1  -30.5  -59.1
Mexico  (6.65)  5.04  2.72  2.70  -46.0  -0.8  -58.3
Burma  (0.05)  0.04  0.02  0.02  -56.9  0.0  -56.9
Haiti  (0.74)  0.56  0.25  0.25  -55.3  0.0  -55.3
Egypt  (2.11)  1.60  0.73  0.73  -54.3  0.0  -54.3
Malaysia  (3.66)  2.78  1.31  1.29  -53.0  -1.0  -53.5
Singapore  (2.98)  2.26  1.38  1.37  -38.8  -0.6  -52.7
Yugoslavia  (0.65)  0.50  0.31  0.31  -36.5  -0.0  -50.7
Jamaica  (1.52)  1.15  0.63  0.60  -44.9  -5.0  -47.6
Colombia  (0.05)  0.04  0.02  0.02  -47.3  0.0  -47.3
Macao  (1.50)  1.14  0.62  0.62  -45.9  -0.0  -45.9
Nepal  (0.17)  0.13  0.09  0.09  -29.9  0.0  -45.5
Taiwan  (China)  (13.93)  10.56  10.55  7.72  -0.1  -26.9  -43.2
Philippines  (3.63)  2.75  2.29  2.01  -16.7  -12.1  -43.1
Pakistan  (3.81)  2.89  2.53  2.36  -12.4  -6.5  -36.4
Korea,  Rep.  of  (11.39)  8.64  8.85  6.09  2.5  -31.2  -29.5
Hong  Kong  (11.21)  8.50  7.90  6.22  -7.1  -21.3  -26.8
(Cont.)(Table 6 concld.)
Mauritius  (0.41)  0.31  0.30  0.30  -3.1  0.0  -24.7
Czechoslovakia  (0.00)  0.00  0.00  0.00  -24.7  -0.0  -24.7
Brazll  (2.35)  1.78  1.45  1.38  -18.5  -5.1  -22.6
Hungary  (0.32)  0.24  0.19  0.19  -20.2  0.0  -20.2
El Salvador  (0.35)  0.27  0.21  0.21  -19.8  0.0  -19.8
China  (11.72)  8.88  11.58  7.73  30.4  -33.3  -13.0
Uruguay  (0.06)  0.05  0.06  0.06  1A.3  0.0  -8.0
Germany, E.  (0.01)  0.01  0.01  0.01  -1.8  0.0  -1.8
Bangladesh  (1.29)  0.98  1.02  1.02  4.4  0.0  4.4
Costa Rica  (0.19)  0.15  0.18  1.18  21.8  -0.0  21.8
India  (2.34)  1.77  2.66  2.20  50.0  -17.2  24.2
United Arab Emirates  (0.08)  0.06  0.10  0.10  73.4  0.0  34-'
Dominican Republic  (0.61)  0.46  0.66  0.66  42.9  -0.3  42.5
Sri Lanka  (0.82)  0.62  1.15  1.15  83.6  -0.0  42.6
Turkey  (0.69)  0.52  1.13  1.12  116.9  -0.2  68.2
Indonesia  (1.62)  1.23  2.26  2.12  83.5  -5.9  72.7
Guatemala  (0.05)  0.04  0.11  0.11  157.3  0.0  157.3
All Countries Above  (100.00)  75.83  67.49  54.33  -11.0  -19.5  -44.3
Rest of the World  - 24.17  32.51  45.67  34.5  40.5  46.8
World  - 100.00  100.00  100.00  0.0  0.0  0.0
Source:  The World Bank computer files on the MFA.
Notes:
a  In the denominator,  actual shipments from the rest of the world in 1988 are added to actual  quota holdings.
b  Based on 1987-1989  actual average shipments.43
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
Accelerated  quota  growth  is  the  main  device  to  phaseout  the  MFA  under
both leading  proposals,  that within the framework  of MFA or a transitional
structure  based on global  quotas.  According  to the first  approach,  country
quotas,  in  the  other,  global  quotas  will  have to  expand  in such  a way  to avoid
a "shock'  when they  are  abolished  at the  end  of the  phaseout. To negotiate  a
quota  growth  scenario,  the  parties  need  points  of departure,  such  as base  year
quota  levels,  quota  growth  rates,  etc. The  guideline  in  the  MFA  was  a  6  percent
annual  quota  growth. Developing  countries  consider  this  a concession  obtained
from industrial  markets,  and request  it as the  minimum  base  year quota  growth
rate.  In fact,  however,  there  were large  variations  in quota  growth  across
products  and suppliers,  as well as across  markets;  and on the whole quotas
expanded  at a significantly  lower  rate.  For the phaseout,  the negotiating
parties  may, therefore,  consider  to allow  some  differentiation  in  quota  growth
rates,  particularly  across  product  categories.
The  historical  record  reveals  that  growth  in  highly  utilized,  i.e.,
filled  and  binding  quotas  was  significantly  lower  compared  to  unfilled  quotas.
Phaseout  scenarios  based  on  quota  growth  may  have  to  take  into  consideration  this
distinction  to achieve  an effective  relaxation. In this context,  scrapping
unfilled  quotas  in stages,  depending  on their  utilization  record,  would  hasten
the  dismantling  of  the  MFA  by  allowing  the  concentration  of  efforts  to  deal  with
binding  quotas.44
There  are  some  inherent  differences  in  the  way  an  MFA-based  versus
a  global  quota-based  phaseout  would  affect  trade  during  the  transitionary  period.
One is  the  obvious  fact  that  a global  quota  encompasses  previously  unrestricted
suppliers. Secondly,  the  first-come-first-serve  principle  gives  a relatively
free  hand  to  the  efficient  suppliers.  Hence  whatever  happens  in  terms  of  losing
or gaining quota allocations  due to the shift co the global quota based
structure,  on an individual  basis,  countries  may  end  up increasing  their  export
volumes  and  market  shares.
Global  quotas  introduce  non-selectivity  to the  system. While  this
is a desirable  element  from the  economic  efficiency  point  of view, it has an
equity  aspect. It  allows  the  importing  countries  to continue  exercising  their
"historical  rights" by determining  the volume of trade,  while denying (or
diluting)  the  "guaranteed"  market  shares  of  individual  exporters.  This  is  a  loss
mainly  for  the  inefficient  suppliers  whose  performance  is  closely  related  to  the
existence  of country  quotas. Moreover,  to the extent  that  global  quotas  are
administered  by the  importing  countries  (the  global  basket  in  the  US  proposal),
the  exporters  lose  the  possibility  to appropriate  quota  rents.
An important  distinction  is that,  while some exporters  would be
considerably  worse-off  under  the  US  proposal  based  on  global  quotas,  the  overall
restrictiveness  of  this transitory  regime is related to  (a conservative
interpretation  of)  its  suggested  parameters  rather  than  the  inherent  nature  of
this  modality. In fact,  global  quotas  could  be set  up quite  generously,  with
a significant  margin  above  the  current  import  levels.45
An MFA-based  phaseout  is appealing  to many developing  countries
because,  in  principle,  the  "acquired  rights"  of  the  exporters  can  be  preserved.
Not for long,  however. If the  developing  countries  get their  way and extract
an agreement  from  industrial  countries  on  substantial  quota  expansions  --  which
is necessary  for a phaseout  --  as the quotas  on efficient  suppliers  become
redundant, quota holdings will be  worthless.  Interestingly  enough, an
accelerated  quota  growth  not  differentiated  across  suppliers,  as suggested  by
the  developing  countries,  would  do  exactly  that.
We see one important  virtue in a phaseout  based on the current
structure  of the  MFA.  That  is,  not  only  the  mechanisms  in place  are familiar
to  the  negotiating  parties,  but so  are  the  magnitudes  of  most  of the  parameters
involved. The  record  on current  quota  levels,  quota  growth  rates  over  the  last
few  years,  and their  utilization  ratios  provide  a basis  for  a decision  on the
most  important  elements  of this  phaseout  based  on the  present  structure  of the
MFA. If  this  approach  is  adopted,  however,  the  parties  have  to  make  a  concerted
effort  to keep in mind that this is not an extension  of the MFA, but its
abolition.46
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